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FRANCHISE REGULATION UNDER THE CALIFORNIA
CORPORATE SECURITIES LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
Franchising is one of the fastest growing facets of business in the
United States.: It has become one of the most successful marketing
devices in the contemporary commercial world,2 accounting for $65
billion annually--over 10 percent of the gross national product.'
Credit for the tremendous growth of the franchising business has
been attributed to the fact that it readily melds the know-how of big
businessmen with the ambition of little businessmen.4 The franchise
system has the advantage of enabling numerous groups of individuals
with small capital to become entrepreneurs. Such a system makes
independent businessmen out of people who would otherwise be
employees of a vast chain store network. This effect is generally good
for the economy;5 however, as can be expected, where experienced
businessmen deal with the unsophisticated, individual hardship often
results. One author, in describing one of the problems in the area,
commented that the franchising business has more than its share of
bunco schemes.0
The California Commissioner of Corporations was concerned with
this same general problem when, in June of 1967, he requested advice
from the California Attorney General concerning the applicability of
the California Corporate Securities Law to franchise agreements. The
Attorney General concluded that franchise agreements, under appro-
priate circumstances, would constitute a security, and in these cases
would be governed by the Corporate Securities Law.7 Pursuant to
this opinion, the Corporations Commissioner published a bulletin
containing guidelines to be considered in examining franchise agree-
ments.
8
In analyzing both the Attorney General's conclusion and the Com-
missioner's expansion of it, the basic premise that franchise agree-
ments will be properly governed by the provisions of the Corporate
1 TIME, May 13, 1966, at 95.
2 Coleman, A Franchise Agreement: Not a "Security' Under the Securities Act of
1933, 22 Bus. LAW. 493 (1967).
8 Bus. WFEK, June 19, 1965, at 76.
4 TimE, supra note 1.
5 See generally Susser v. Carve], 206 F. Supp. 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
8 H. KuRsH, THE FRANcHxsE Boom (1962).
7 49 OPs. CAL. ATT'y GEN. 124 (1967).
8 CAL. Div. OF CoRP., Bull. No. 67-8 (July 14, 1967).
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Securities Law will not be questioned.9 Rather, attention will center
upon the method of application of the Blue Sky Law1 to these
agreements.
The Attorney General's opinion will first be placed in historical
context, emphasizing investment contracts. The opinion will then be
analyzed as to its effect on franchise agreements. This will be fol-
lowed by (1) a discussion of problems implicit in the approach taken
by the Attorney General and the Corporations Commissioner; and
(2) a suggested modification of this approach, which is intended to
facilitate reasonable control of franchise agreements under the Blue
Sky Law consistent with judicial history and interpretation of legisla-
tive intent.
II. BACKGROUND
The California Corporate Securities Law1 includes within the
definition of a security a certificate of interest in a profit sharing
agreement, an investment contract, or a beneficial interest in title to
property, profits or earnings."2 Under appropriate circumstances, the
term "franchise agreement" may be classified as either an investment
contract or a beneficial interest in title to property, profits or earnings.
9 While we have defined the limits of this note to exclude discussion of the basic
underlying premise that the proper mode of regulation of franchise agreements is the
Corporate Securities Law, this restriction should not be interpreted as an acquiescence
in the conclusion that the basic premise is necessarily correct. The California Attorney
General argues that the Corporate Securities Law is applicable to franchise agreements.
Although we have accomodated the Attorney General on this point, it would behoove
parties litigating the issue, or parties otherwise interested, not to overlook the possible
argument that franchise agreements would be better regulated in another way, such as
through specific legislation. Inasmuch as a full discussion of this aspect of the expan-
sive subject of franchise regulation would require greater breadth than a student note
permits, we have chosen to emphasize current developments, and have, therefore,
accepted the same general limitations of scope recently adopted by the Attorney General.
10 This phrase has been adopted as a synonym for legislation providing for the
regulation of securities. This meaning was derived from a United States Supreme Court
opinion where, in upholding the validity of this type of legislation, the Court said that
such laws were designed to protect the public against "speculative schemes which have
no more basis than so many feet of blue sky... Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S.
539, 550 (1917).
11 CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25000-26104 (West 1955) [hereinafter referred to as the
act].
12 CAL. CORP. CODE § 25008 (West 1955),
"Security" includes all of the following:
(a) Any stock, including treasury stock; any certificate of interest or partici-
pation; any certificate of interest in a profit-sharing agreement; any certificate
of interest in an oil, gas, or mining title or lease; any transferable share, in-
vestment contract, or benefical interest in title to property, profits, or earnings.
(b) Any bond; any debenture; any collateral trust certificate; any note;
any evidence of indebtedness, whether interest-bearing or not.
(c) Any guarantee of a security.
(d) Any certificate of deposit for a security.
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The precise category within which a franchise agreement falls will
not be determinative since the courts will scrutinize the substance
rather than the form of a business transaction in order to ascertain
whether it comes within the regulatory purpose of the Corporate
Securities Law."'
The definition of a "security" under the California Corporate
Securities Law has come to encompass not only well recognized cor-
porate securities, 14 but other less obvious interests, whether issued
by corporations, trustees, partnerships or individuals.15 By using the
word "includes" in section 25008, the California Legislature indicated
that this section was not intended to be inclusive in its definition of a
security. Furthermore, in deciding whether the particular instrument
is to be considered a security within the meaning of section 25008,
the California courts have consistently refused to define a security
with any degree of finality' and instead have looked to the particular
facts of each case to determine if these facts fall within the "regula-
tory purpose" of the statute.'7
An early California case enunciated a definition of a security,
holding that "[i] f the instrument of sale creates a present right to a
present or future participation in either the income, profits or assets
of a business carried on for profit, it is a 'security' .. '. .1,8 This broad
definition is of little value when confronted with specific facts, and
of less value in defining an investment contract. It will be necessary
therefore to consider some of the federal and California cases that
have been instrumental in the development of the definition of a
security, and more specifically, the definition of an investment con-
'3 SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); Silver Hills Country Club v.
Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961); People v. Syde,
37 Cal. 2d 765, 235 P.2d 601 (1951); Austin v. Hallmark Oil Co., 21 Cal. 2d 718,
134 P.2d 777 (1943); People v. Davenport, 13 Cal. 2d 681, 91 P.2d 892 (1939);
Domestic & Foreign Pet. Co. v. Long, 4 Cal. 2d 547, 51 P.2d 73 (1935); People v.
Hosher, 92 Cal. App. 2d 250, 206 P.2d 882 (1949); Hollywood State Bank v. Wilde,
70 Cal. App. 2d 103, 160 P.2d 846 (1945); People v. Steele, 2 Cal. App. 2d 370, 36
P.2d 40 (1934). See also People v. Sidwell, 27 Cal. 2d 121, 162 P.2d 913 (1945);
Dahlquist, Regulation and Civil Liability Under the California Corporate Securities
Act, 33 CALIF. L. REV. 343 (1945).
14 E.g., stocks, bonds, debentures.
15 CAL. CORP. CODE § 25008 (West 1955).
16 People v. Syde, 37 Cal. 2d 765, 235 P.2d 601 (1951). See also 28 CALIF. L. Ray.
410 (1940); 10 S. CAL. L. REV. 483 (1937).
17 Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal.
Rptr. 186 (1961). See, e.g., People v. Syde, 37 Cal. 2d 765, 235 P.2d 601 (1951);
In re Hatch, 10 Cal. 2d 147, 73 P.2d 885 (1937).
18 People v. Oliver, 102 Cal. App. 29, 36, 282 P. 813, 817 (1929). See generally
Dahlquist, supra note 13, at 356-61. -
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tract, since both include investment contracts as a security within
their respective Blue Sky Laws.
III. INVESTMENT CONThACTS
In cases not involving the obvious securities-stocks, bonds, or
debentures-the courts developed the following test to determine
what constituted a security. Where the purchaser invested for profit
in a venture that was to be conducted largely by others, a security did
exist. However, where he invested in a venture in which he expected
to participate actively, no security existed.' 9
In SEC v. Joiner Corp.,1° the United States Supreme Court held
that the sale of oil and gas leases constituted an investment contract
within the meaning of Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933.21
The Joiner Corporation had acquired 3,002 acres of land pursuant to
an agreement that a test well would be drilled by Joiner. The cor-
poration expected to finance the drilling from the resale of small
parcels of acreage to the public. The prospectus that was mailed out
assured the recipients that Joiner would complete the drilling of a
test well to determine the oil-producing capabilities of the parcels
to be sold. This literature characterized the purchase as an investment
and as a participation enterprise. The Court did not accept the
defendants' contention that their offerings were for the conveyance
of an interest in real estate:
In applying acts of this general purpose, the courts have not been
guided by the nature of the assets back of a particular document or
offering. The test rather is what character the instrument is given in
commerce by the terms of the offer, the plan of distribution, and
the economic inducements held out to the prospect. In the enforce-
ment of an act such as this it is not inappropriate that promoters'
offerings be judged as being what they were represented to be.22
The Joiner Court, although confronted with an investment con-
tract, did not define the term, but restricted itself to a discussion of
its elements.
11 See, e.g., People v. Syde, 37 Cal. 2d 765, 235 P.2d 601 (1951); Austin v.
Hallmark Oil Co., 21 Cal. 2d 718, 134 P.2d 777 (1943); People v. Davenport, 13 Cal.
2d 681, 91 P.2d 892 (1939); Domestic & Foreign Pet. Co. v. Long, 4 Cal. 2d 547,
51 P.2d 73 (1935); People v. Hosher, 92 Cal. App. 2d 250, 206 P.2d 882 (1949);
Hollywood State Bank v. Wilde, 70 Cal. App. 2d 103, 160 P.2d 846 (1945); People
v. Steele, 2 Cal. App. 2d 370, 36 P.2d 40 (1934).
20 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
21 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1964). The CAL. CORP. CODE § 25008 (West 1955) has
adopted similar language.
22 320 U.S. at 352-53.
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Three years after joiner, the Supreme Court decided SEC v. TV. I.
Howey Co.,2 considered to be the landmark case defining investment
contracts.2 4 W. J. Howey Company and Howey-in-the-Hills Service
Company were Florida corporations under common control and
management. The Howey Company owned large tracts of citrus
groves, planting about 500 acres annually, half of which were
retained, with the other half being offered to the public. Howey-in-
the-Hills was a service company which cultivated and harvested its
own groves as well as the groves sold, and marketed the entire yield.
The superiority of Howey-in-the-Hills as a servicing company was
emphasized, with prospective customers being offered both a land
sale, and a servicing contract. For a specified fee, including the cost
of labor and material, Howey-in-the-Hills was given full discretion
and authority over the cultivation of the groves. The purchasers for
the most part were from out of state, and consisted primarily of
people who lacked the knowledge, skill and equipment necessary to
cultivate the citrus trees. The sole indicia of the multiple ownership
of the groves were found in small land marks, intelligible only
through the perusal of a plat book record.
The Supreme Court held that the offering of the citrus groves,
coupled with the service contract and the remittance of the net pro-
ceeds to the purchasers, constituted an investment contract under
Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933.5 Initially, the Court
noted that while the term "investment contract" was not defined in
the Securities Act, it was a term common in many of the state blue
sky laws prior to 1933.26 Illustrative of this was the 1920 decision of
State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co.,2 7 wherein the Minnesota Supreme
Court stated:
No case has been called to our attention defining the term "invest-
ment contract." The placing of capital or laying out of money in a
way intended to secure income or profit from its employment is an
"investment" as that word is commonly used and understood.28
Thereafter, the Howey Court observed, this broad definition was
judicially applied to situations where individuals were led to invest
money in a common enterprise with the expectation that a profit
23 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
24 1 Loss, SEcuRiTsES REGULATION 483 (2d ed. 1961).
25 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1964).
26 328 U.S. at 298. The term first appeared in a statutory definition of a "security"
in the Minnesota Blue Sky Law of 1917. MNN. GEN. LAW, ch. 429, § 3 (1917).
27 146 Minn. 52, 177 N.W. 937 (1920).
28 Id. at 56, 177 N.W. at 938.
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would be derived solely through the efforts of someone other than
themselves. 9 Thus, the Supreme Court concluded in Howey that by
including the term "investment contracts" in the Securities Act of
1933,
... Congress was using a term the meaning of which had been
crystallized by this prior judicial interpretation .... [A] n invest-
ment contract for purposes of the Securities Act means a contract,
transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a
common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts
of the promoter or a third party .... Such a definition necessarily
underlies this Court's decision in S.E.C. v. joiner Corp .... 20
The Howey Court rejected the argument that an investment con-
tract is lacking where the venture is not speculative or promotional
in character, emphasizing that the criteria for determining an invest-
ment contract are met where "the scheme involves an investment of
money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the
efforts of others."31 The two essential elements are: (1) a common
enterprise and (2) profits to come solely from the efforts of one other
than the investor.3 2 The second element of this test implies a third
factor employed by the courts to determine the existence of a security,
that of participation in the enterprise by the investor, i.e., the degree
of control the investor has over the enterprise.
The control element (participation by the investor) is apparently
the main criterion applied by the courts.33 Generally, if the investor
participates actively in the management or conduct of the enterprise
he is not purchasing a security.34 Where the investor "share[s] in
the conduct of the enterprise, the instrument representing an assign-
ment of a fractional interest . . . is not a security within the act."35
29 E.g., People v. White, 124 Cal. App. 548, 12 P.2d 1078 (1932); State v.
Evans, 154 Minn. 95, 191 N.W. 425 (1922). See also Moore v. Stella, 52 Cal. App.
2d 766, 778, 127 P.2d 300, 306 (1942), where the court held, under a broader state
definition (see People v. Oliver, 102 Cal. App. 29, 36, 282 P. 813, 817 (1929)), that
a security was involved in
all schemes for investment, regardless of the forms of procedure employed,
which are designed to lead investors into enterprises where the earnings and
profits of business or speculative ventures must come through the management,
control, and operations of others and which, regardless of form, have the
characteristics of operations by corporations, trusts or similar business struc-
tures.
30 328 U.S. at 298-99.
31 Id. at 301.
32 Id.
33 Dahlquist, supra note 13, at 358.
84 E.g., Austin v. Hallmark Oil Co., 21 Cal. 2d 718, 134 P.2d 777 (1943); People
v. Steele, 2 Cal. App. 2d 370, 36 P.2d 40 (1934).
3a Austin v. Hallmark Oil Co., 21 Cal. 2d 718, 727, 134 P.2d 777, 782-83 (1943).
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But if the investor's role is merely a passive one, sharing in the pro-
ceeds or profits of the enterprise without controlling or participating
in the management, it has been generally held that the sale of a
security is involved.3" Two California cases that vividly illustrate these
principles are People v. Syde87 and Hollywood State Bank v. Wilde.3 8
In the Wilde case, the Chapman Chinchilla Sales Company, a
Nevada corporation, sold chinchillas through its sales agents for
$3,200 a pair. Concurrently, the company contracted with the pur-
chasers for the maintenance of the chinchillas on breeding farms at
a reasonable monthly rate. Arrangements were also made for sale of
the pelts through an affiliated company and for division of the
profits with the investor-owners. Since none of the purchasers had
any knowledge or skill in the handling or selling of the chinchillas
or in the marketing of the pelts, the necessity for such a contract was
stressed. In holding that these transactions constituted the sale of
securities, the court said:
[I] t is readily apparent that the investor in chinchillas did not rely
alone upon the processes of nature to enrich him. He reckoned
upon sharing profits to be earned by an intelligent, experienced and
industrious organization in the care, breeding and sales of the
rodents. The company candidly represented that it was selling its
ingenious services along with the chinchillas .... Therefore it was
not an investment in the animals only but in service as well ....
By making such investments [the purchasers] had no thought but
that they would profit by the combined and organized efforts of the
two corporations .... 39
This quotation emphasizes the inverse relationship between participa-
tion and the expectation of profits derived solely from the efforts of
36 Domestic & Foreign Pet. Co. v. Long, 4 Cal. 2d 547, 555, 51 P.2d 73, 76 (1935)
wherein the court stated:
Instruments such as those in ... the instant case are not issued to persons who
expect to reap a profit from their own services and efforts exerted in the
management and operation of oil-bearing property, but to those in the category
of investors, who, for a consideration paid, stipulate for a right to share in
the profits or proceeds of a business enterprise or venture to be conducted by
others. The defendants herein have less voice in the control of the enterprise
than stockholders in a corporation, who may vote at stockholders' meetings.
In decisions in this state and in other jurisdictions where it has been con-
tended that a transaction under attack did not come within the Corporate
Securities Act because it constituted only a sale of specific real or personal
property or an interest therein, the courts have looked through form to sub-
stance and found that in fact the transaction contemplated the conduct of a
business enterprise by others than the purchasers, in the profits or proceeds of
which the purchasers were to share.
ST 37 Cal. 2d 765, 235 P.2d 601 (1951).
8 70 Cal. App. 2d 103, 160 P.2d 846 (1945).
89 Id. at 107, 160 P.2d at 847-48.
NOTES
one other than the investor. A complete reliance on others for the
management, control and production necessarily precludes any
genuine participation by the investor.
In the Syde case, an independent movie production company con-
tracted with parents to cast their children in film productions. The
parents made cash down payments, plus further minimal payments
for each rehearsal. The contract also provided that upon the sale or
other disposition of the film, 60 percent of the gross receipts would
be distributed equally among the members of the cast. The studio
was to pay all costs and expenses of the production. They also
reserved the right to reject any cast member, and had the complete
control over the distribution and sales of any of the films. Since the
agreements contemplated actual participation by the children in films
from which they might have realized a profit, the contracts, down
payments, and other fees, could not be considered as constituting an
investment contract. The Syde court concluded that " [a]n agreement
to render personal services for compensation could not be considered
a security, even though the sale of a beneficial interest in such an
agreement may come within the statute." 4°
Courts have held, however, that nominal participation alone will
not preclude the application of the Corporate Securities Law. For
example, the court in State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Compan4 1
indicated that the investor's efforts in the conduct of the enterprise
must be more than token participation.42 In Gopher Tire, participa-
tion by an investor in the form of unofficial advertising services on
behalf of the venture was not sufficient participation to take the
transaction out of the scope of the securities regulations.
In People v. Jaques,4 3 California accepted Minnesota's definition
of an investment contract by announcing the following general rule:
[I] f the enterprise is in the nature of a joint venture or if the in-
vestor is to have an active participation in its formation, or its
operation is dependent for its success partly on the efforts of the
particular investor, then, in any such event, the Corporate Securities
Law does not apply.44
This broad statement was later put into proper perspective in People
40 37 Cal. 2d at 768, 235 P.2d at 603.
41 146 Minn. 52, 177 N.W. 937 (1920).
42 Id. at 53, 177 N.W. at 938.
43 .137 Cal. App. 2d 823, 291 P.2d 124 (1955).
44 Id. at 834, 291 P.2d at 131.
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v. Mills,45 where the court dispelled any .intimation that persondil
services performed by the buyer could immunize a sale of stock with-
out a permit, holding that the rulings in Syde and similar cases applied
to situations that did not involve stock issuances, but rather, applied
to investment contracts4 6
From these cases it can be seen that participation by the investor
has been a key factor in determining the existence of an investment
contract. Where the investor actively participates, he will, ndt be
deriving profits solely from the efforts of others because his own
efforts will be a factor in producing a share of the profits. The Cor-
porate Securities Law was "not intended to afford supervisign and
regulation of instruments which constitute agreements with persons
who expect to reap a profit from their own services ox other active
participation in a business venture."
47
The preceding cases were all concerned with various jirdicial inter-
pretations of what was needed to constitute an investment contract.
These rules were rather general in nature since the courts examined
each case on its own merits, rather than attempting to lay down any
precise rules for future courts to follow. This generally was necessary,
since specificity "would . . . aid the unscrupulous in circumventing
the law."48 This approach was applied somewhat mechanically until
1961, when the California Supreme Court decided a case that, al-
though not involving an investment contract, could weigh heavily
in the determination of the existence of an investment contract, and
more particularly, in the treatment to be given a franchise agreement
under the California Corporate Securities Law.
IV. THE SILVER HILLS CASE
Decided in 1961 Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski,49 gave the
Supreme Court of California another opportunity to define the term
"security." This case involved a partnership established to organize
a country club. As a first step toward the realization of their goal, the
promoters contracted to purchase a parcel of improved land for
$75,000. This contract provided for a down payment of $400, which
represented the only cash investment to be made by the promoters.
The large amount of additional capital necessary to finance the
45 162 Cal. App. 2d 840, 328 P.2d 1049 (1958).
46 See also People v. Clark, 215 Cal. App. 2d 734, 30 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1963).
41 People v. Syde, 37 Cal. 2d 765, 768, 235 P.2d 601, 603 (1951).
48 State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 53, 177 N.W. 937, 938 (1920).
49 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961).
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project was to be raised through the sale of what were designated
"memberships." 50 The California Commissioner of Corporations con-
cluded that these "memberships" were securities within the meaning
of ihe Blue Sky Law, and therefore issued a "desist and refrain
order.""1 After a motion to vacate this order had been denied, a writ
of mandate was sought from the Superior Court. The writ was
grAnted and subsequently affirmed by the California District Court
of Appeal.52 The Commissioner then appealed to the California
Supreme Court.
The supreme court, speaking through the now Chief Justice
Traynor, reversed, holding that the sale of the memberships was the
sale of a security and, thus, required a permit.13
The holding resulted from a consideration of two factors. First,
the supreme court rejected the lower court's conclusion, holding that
the situation fell within the literal meaning of the act since the pur-
chaser of a membership had a contractual right to use the club
facilities-ba right that could not be revoked except for his own mis-
behavior or failure to pay dues. The court characterized such an
irrevocable right as, "a beneficial interest in title to property within
the literal language of subsection (a) of section 25008." Second,
the court went- on to say that the crucial question was, whether the
sale of such a membership comes within the regulatory purpose of
the Corporate Securities Act, which is:
[T]o protect the public agairist spurious schemes, however in-
geniously devised; to attract risk capital .... [And] to afford those
who risk their capital at least a fair chance of realizing their ob-
jectives in legitimate ventures whether or not they expect a return
on their capital in one form or another.55
50 Id. at 812-13, 361 P.2d at 907, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 187. ("They plan to sell a total
of 200 'charter memberships' for $150 each, thereby raising $30,000; 300 memberships
for $200 each, thereby raising $60,000, and 500 memberships for $250 each, thereby
raising $75,000.")
51 CAL. CORP. CODE § 25514 (West 1955).
Whenever in the opinion of the commissioner the further sale of any
securities by any company would be unfair, unjust, or inequitable to the pur-
chasers of the securities, the commissioner may order the company to desist
and refrain from the further sale of its securities.
52 Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 9 Cal. Rptr. 694 (1960).
53 CAL. CORP. CODE § 25500 (West Supp. 1966).
No company shall sell any security of its own issue, except upon a sale for a
delinquent assessment against the security made in accordance with the laws of
this State, or offer for sale, negotiate for the sale of, or take subscriptions for
any such security, until it has first applied for and secured from the commis-
sioner a permit authorizing it so to do.
54 55 Cal. 2d at 814, 361 P.2d at 908, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
55 Id. at 814-15, 361 P.2d at 908-09, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188-89.
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The sale in Silver Hills was found to be within the stated regulatory
purpose.
On its face, Silver Hills seemed to conclude that the purpose of
the Corporate Securities Law was generally to protect investors from
investing in questionable schemes." In the particular fact situation
of Silver Hills, the court apparently believed that a project requiring
capitalization of over $150,000 was not adequately stabilized by a
promoters' investment of only $400. This was especially true since
the success of the project was left entirely in the hands of the promo-
ters, with the investors taking a passive position. In short, the court
was of the opinion that the purchasers did not have a fair opportunity
to realize the fruits of their investment 7
This concern for the investor, together with the fact that a bene-
ficial interest in land was sold, led the court to conclude that the
transaction was of the type that the legislature had contemplated in
passing the act. Viewed in this light, the case appears to be a logical
extension of prior decisions in the area. However, the significance of
Silver Hills is to be found in the discussion of two concepts which
the court employed in reaching its conclusion.
A. Expectation of Profit
The first of these concepts was the "expectation of profits" test.
Traditionally, the opportunity for profit was an inherent feature of
an investment contract; it was essential to finding a securityY8 The
Silver Hills court, however, stated that the Corporate Securities Law
even extended to transactions where no profits or material benefits
could be realized; expectation of profit to the investor is not a test
under the act, since the regulatory purpose of the act is "to afford
those who risk their capital at least a fair chance of realizing their
objectives in legitimate ventures whether or not they expect a return
on their capital in one form or another."19 This is a significant
56 The court cites Dahlquist, supra note 13, at 360, wherein this commentator
states:
As a general rule, the sale of "securities" that is condemned by the courts
involves an attempt by an issuer to raise funds for a business venture or
enterprise; an indiscriminate offering to the public at large where the persons
solicited are selected at random;- a passive position on the part of the investor;
and the conduct of the enterprise by the issuer with other people's money.
57 55 Cal. 2d at 815, 361 P.2d at 909, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
58 See generally BALLANaNm AND STERLING, CALIFORNIA CoR'oRTxONS LAW
§ 479 (1949); Dahlquist, supra note 13, at 358.
59 55 Cal. 2d at 815, 361 P.2d at 908, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188 (emphasis added). The
court reaches this conclusion by analogy to other parts of the Corporate Securities Law:
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departure from the "expectation of profits" rule previously followed
by the California courts.60
Until Silver Hills, with one exception,61 every state and federal
case, which considered whether a membership or interest in property
constituted a security, found either an expectation of profit to the
investor 62 or evidence of an indebtedness.63 While not ruling out the
expectation of profit factor entirely, the Silver Hills court did assert
that the expectation of material benefit was not a requirement that
must be found to bring the transaction within the purview of the
act. However, this assertion could be considered dicta; the members,
although not expecting a cash return, were expecting "benefits" from
the transaction. The court did say that "the act is as dearly applicable
to the sale of promotional memberships in the present case as it
would be had the purchasers expected their return in some such
familiar form as dividends."6
Clearly, Silver Hills de-emphasized the "expectation of profit"
element. In essence, this was done to emphasize the crucial test of
the Corporate Securities Law: consideration of its "regulatory pur-
pose." Implicit in this emphasis is a recognition that mechanical
tests are often inadequate to deal with new schemes that threaten the
public.65 If a situation falls within the regulatory purpose of the act,
it would seem unreasonable to force a court either to twist the facts
to find an expectation of profit where none exists, or fail to give the
full intended effect to the act because of a highly restrictive, technical
test.,
Silver Hills does not foreclose future consideration of "expectation
"Thus from its exemption of certain nonprofit companies the act specifically excepts
'notes, bonds, debentures, or other evidence of indebtedness whether interest-bearing or
not.'" (court's emphasis). Id. See CAL. CoRP. CODE § 25102(a) (West Supp. 1966).
60 See 14 HASr. L.J. 181, 182 (1962).
61 Davenport v United States, 260 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1958). In this case the
defendant sold "memberships" in the Mt. Hood Hardboard and Plywood Cooperative.
By purchasing these memberships, the members were promised continuous employment
and job security. The defendant was convicted for fraud in the sale of securities under
section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933. Hence, the memberships must have been
securities even without expectation of profit, to support the conviction.
62 E.g., United States v. Monjar, 47 F. Supp. 421 (D. Del. 1942); Hacker v.
Goldberg, 263 Ill. App. 73 (1931); Lewis v. Creasey Corp., 198 Ky. 409, 248 S.W.
1046 (1923). See generally Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d 1140 (1963).
63 E.g., United States v. Monjar, 47 F. Supp. 421 (D. Del. 1942); SEC v. United
Prosperity Plan, Inc., 1 S.E.C. Jud. Dec. 435 (D. Utah 1937). But see 24 O's. CAL.
ATf'Y GEN. 33 (1954).
64 55 Cal. 2d at 815-16, 361 P.2d at 909, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
65 See generally 14 HAsT. LJ. 181, 184 (1962).
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of profit." This feature is inherent in many securities, 6 and can be
useful as an indicatiop of a security."' Nevertheless, "expectation of
profit" is not a requirement and therefore is not a test. The Silver
Hills case put "expectation of profit" in its proper perspective.
B. Risk Capital
The second significant concept is "risk capital." This phrase was
first judicially employed in Silver Hills, but it is safe to say that it
has not made its last judicial appearance. The phrase "risk capital"
was used throughout the opinion, but it was never defined. A precise
definition is necessary in order to apply the concept to franchise
agreements to determine if they are securities.
The court used "risk capital" and "risk" in several contexts.08 In
light of these uses, it appears that there are three basic definitions of
"risk capital" consistent with its use in the Silver Hills opinion. One
possibility is that it was used to mean initial capital: capital used to
promote a previously nonexistent project. Support for this definition
can be found in the court's observation that "[w] e have here nothing
like the ordinary sale of a right to use existing facilities."09 This may
mean that if the money is used to improve an existing facility rather
than to begin one, it will not involve a security.7° Further, the court
06 E.g., stocks, bonds.
07 See Sarmento v. Arbax Packing Co., 231 Cal. App. 2d 421, 41 Cal. Rptr. 869
(1964); Craft v. Brooks, 204 Cal. App. 2d 187, 22 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1962).
168 "Risk" or "risk capital" was used in the following instances:
Section 25008 defines a security broadly to protect the public against spurious
schemes, however ingeniously devised, to attract risk capital.
Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 814, 361 P.2d 906, 907, 13 Cal.
Rptr. 186, 187 (1961) (emphasis added).
We have here nothing like the ordinary sale of a right to use existing facilities.
Petitioners are soliciting the risk capital with which to develop a business for
profit. The purchaser's risk is not lessened merely because the interest he
purchases is labelled a membership. Only because he risks his capital along
with other purchasers can there be any chance that the benefits of club mem-
berships will materialize.
Id. at 815, 361 P.2d at 908, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188 (emphasis added).
Since the act does not make profit to the supplier of capital the test of what
is a security, it seems all the more clear that its objective is to afford those
who risk their capital at least a fair chance of realizing their objectives in
legitimate ventures ....
Id. (emphasis added).
Hence the act [applies to the memberships in this case]. Properly so, for
otherwise it could too easily be vitiated by inventive substitutes for conven-
tional means of raising risk capital.
Id. at 815-16, 361 P.2d at 909, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 189 (emphasis added).
69 55 Cal. 2d at 815, 361 P.2d at 908, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
70 See Sobieski, Securities Regulation in California: Recent Developments, ii
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1, 7 (1964).
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found that "[p]etitioners [were] soliciting risk capital with which
to develop a business for profit."7' 1 In fact, the petitioners were solicit-
ing initial capital with which to develop a business for profit, and the
court may have been using the term "risk capital" in this very restric-
tive sense.
Another possibility is that the phrase "risk capital" was used to
indicate capital invested in a scheme which incorporates features
making it risky or questionable. This interpretation is indicated by
the court's concern over the great disparity in the amount to be raised
from the sale of the memberships and the amount furnished by the
promoters.72 In the court's judgment the proposed project lacked a
stable foundation, i.e., it was a risky investment. Implicit in the court's
statement that there was no sale of a right to use an existing facil-
ity, 3 is its assurance, although admittedly not voiced, that had
this been such a sale, the result would have been different. It was
argued above that the difference lay in the stage of the project. Since
the facilitity did not exist, money invested was initial capital. It is now
suggested that the court could have meant that the situation would
have been different because, had the club existed, the purchase of a
membership would involve less risk of loss. The project undertaken
by the promoters would not have been as "risky" if the facilities had
already been completed. Unfortunately, however, the court only
mentioned that the situation would have been different; it did not
indicate why.
The court offered further support to this meaning of the term
"risk capital" where it asserted that
[t]he purchaser's risk is not lessened merely because the interest
he purchases is labeled a membership. Only because he risks his
capital along with other purchasers can there be any chance that
the benefits of club membership will materialize. 74
Here again the court was concerned with the "riskiness" of the ven-
ture and the corresponding financial danger to the investor.
A third possibility is that the court used the phrase "risk capital" to
define a much broader situation than the two discussed above. The
phrase may have been used to mean "risked" capital, meaning money
71 55 Cal. 2d at 815, 361 P.2d at 908, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188 (emphasis added).
72 The promoters furnished $400 as compared to the $165,000 to be raised by
selling memberships.
73 55 Cal. 2d at 815, 361 P.2d at 908, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
74 Id. (emphasis added).
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invested with a risk of loss, or more precisely, any capital invested
with less than a fair chance of realizing a return. This interpretation
would include all investment defined as "risky" and probably a large
percentage of investments of "initial capital"; however, "risked
capital" would also include investments in ventures which were much
safer than those included within the definition of "risky capital," as
well as investments into ventures which, being partially completed,
are not considered "initial capital." This definition of risk capital can
also find logical support in the Silver Hills opinion. The court
reasoned that a "security" is defined broadly, so as to "protect the
public against spurious schemes, however ingeniously devised, to
attract risk capital." 75 While the court relied on People v. Syde7o for
this general proposition, the phrase, "to attract risk capital," was not
used in Syde but was added by the Silver Hills court. If the court
meant that "risk capital" denotes either initial or risky capital, then
the meaning of the Syde case was indeed limited in Silver Hills. If risk
capital means initial capital, then the court has restricted the rule of
the Syde case so that the purpose of the act is to protect the public
against spurious schemes designed to attract only initial capital. If
risk capital means risky investments, then the court may have meant
that the act only protects the public against highly speculative
schemes. However, the court may have intended merely to restate
the Syde rule, not to restrict it. This would be accomplished if "risk
capital" means "risked capital." Thus the phrase, "to protect the
public against spurious schemes ... to attract risk capital,"77 could be
paraphrased to read: to protect the public against schemes which have
less than a fair chance of success. In fact, later in the opinion the court
states directly that the purpose of the act is "to afford those who
risk their capital at least a fair chance of realizing their objec-
tives .... ,"78 This view of the act would seem to support the broad
meaning of "risk capital."
Confronted with the particular fact situation in Silver Hills, the
court's conclusion was the proper one. It matters not that the court
failed to delineate whether the ratio decidendi was that the invest-
ment was "risky," that the money was "initial capital," or that the
investor had less than a fair chance of realizing a return for his
75 Id. at 814, 361 P.2d at 907, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
76 37 Cal. 2d at 768, 235 P.2d at 601.
77 55 Cal' 2d at 814, 361 P.2d at 907, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 187 (emphasis added).
78 Id. at 815, 361 P.2d at 908, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
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money. All three of these conditions existed, and thus there was no
doubt that the situation would fall within the purview of the act.
Nevertheless, in applying the "risk capital" test to other situations
where only one of the three circumstances is present, it will be
necessary to decide which of the definitions is represented by the
phrase. If the "risk capital" test is to be used in situations which are
not identical to that in Silver Hills, there are several problems which
must be faced and resolved.
If risk capital means initial capital, can it be said that any offering
which solicits money for a project untried and nonexistent, will re-
quire a permit? That is, would the fact that the money was to be part
of the initial capital be sufficient in itself to bring the transaction
within the scope of the Blue Sky Law, regardless of other circum-
stances? For instance, assume that the business is very carefully
planned with the maximum amount of caution and good business
judgment, or that the entire project is underwritten so that the
investor is to incur none of the risk. If "risk capital" means initial
capital, and the protection of the act extends only to investments of
risk capital, would an investment into a very "risky" business be
denied the protection of the act, merely because the money was not
initial capital in the strict sense? Could an investment into an exist-
ing business, which operated on the fringes of bankruptcy, be con-
sidered "initial" in the sense of reorganization capital?
Problems also arise in relation to the other definitions. For ex-
ample, if the definition of risk capital is "risky capital," there would,
of course, be a problem of drawing the line between those invest-
ments which are "risky" and those which, although unsafe, are not
"risky." Would an investment which ordinarily would be within the
scope of the act, be denied the protection of the act, where the in-
vestor is sophisticated and fully apprised of the risks of the invest-
ment by the offeror before entering into the transaction? Conversely,
can an offering, which would ordinarily not be within the scope
of the act, be brought under the control of the Commissioner because
it makes the investment seem much safer to the uneducated buyer
than it really is?
As yet, these questions have not been judicially answered, and, of
course, they represent only a small portion of the potential problems
that will arise regardless of which definition of "risk capital".is
accepted.
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V. CONTROL OF FRANCHISES UNDER
SECUITImS LAw
According to Black's Law Dictionary, the word "franchise" was
originally defined in England as a royal privilege conferred by the
crown upon a subject. Today, in this country, we understand a fran-
chise to be a special privilege, not enjoyed by the public in general,
which is granted by one person, real or artificial, to another. 79 A
whole range of franchise plans can be imagined, encompassing the
simple grant of a license to use a name or formula, as well as a more
complicated arrangement involving a complete business-including
supplies, operating instructions, advertising, and employees. The
purchaser may intend to exercise the franchise as his sole business, or
he may intend to remain in another occupation and exercise the fran-
chise merely as an investment.80 In the spectrum of possible franchise
arrangements there are some situations where a security clearly does
exist, and others where it is equally clear that a security does not exist.
Between the two extremes is a vast gray area in need of deeper con-
sideration.
The first portion of this note was concerned with the historical
elements of a security-primarily, the components of an investment
contract-and the current developments-mainly, the Silver Hills
case and the concept of "risk capital." The remainder will be devoted
to an examination of the recent California Attorney General's opinion
and the elaboration thereon by the California Corporations Commis-
sioner. These opinions elucidate situations under which franchise
agreements are subject to regulation under the California Corporate
Securities Law.
A. The Attorney General's Opinion
The California Attorney General has constructed three hypotheti-
cal situations to determine whether a franchise agreement would
constitute a security within the meaning of the California Corporate
Securities Law.8'
First, the franchisee (investor) participates only nominally in
the franchised business in exchange for a share of the profits.
Second, the franchisee participates actively in the franchised busi-
79 BLAcK'S LAW DICTIONARY 786-87 (4th ed. 1957).
80 See generally Coleman, supra note 2.
81 49 Ops. CAL. ATT'Y GEN. 124-25 (1967).
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ness and the franchisor agrees to provide goods and services to
him.
Third, the franchisee participates actively in the business and the
franchisor agrees to provide goods and services, but further intends
to acquire a substantial portion of the initial capital needed to do
so out of the franchise price.
Each of these situations raises the issue of participation by the
franchisee in the venture. As previously noted, the investor's active
participation will normally remove the transaction from the purview
of the Corporate Securities Law.
Since the franchise is a "nominal" participant in the first hypo-
thetical posed by the Attorney General, the perplexing problem of
the degree of participation arises. Nominal participation alone will
not be sufficient to remove a transaction or venture from the area of
securities regulation. This was evidenced by the cases following
Howey,82 which did not attach a literal meaning to the word "solely"
in the phrase, profits to come solely from the efforts of the promoter
or a third party.83 The participation must be genuine, with some
discretion left to the franchisee.84 To hold otherwise would only
thwart the purpose of the securities regulations, which is to afford
the fullest protection to the investing public and the least interfer-
ence with honest business. Each case will have to be examined on its
own merits in order to determine the degree of participation by the
franchisee in the venture. The agreement itself may provide the sole
indication of where the line should be drawn between participation
and nonparticipation. The franchise agreement may dictate many of
the operational functions to the franchisor, including: the price to be
charged, the mode of advertising, the source of supplies, the type of
building, the hours of operation, and innumerable other possibilities.
An agreement that strips the franchisee of the major decision-making
responsibilities may preclude him from being an "active" partici-
pant, even though he still "manages" the business, keeps the books,
pays the bills, and hires and fires the employees. However, it is
possible that complete physical participation, along with only mini-
82 E.g., Blackwell v. Bensten, 302 P.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. dismissed, 347
U.S. 925 (1954); People v. Jaques, 137 Cal. App. 2d 823, 291 P.2d 124 (1955).
83 SEC v. Howey, 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
84 See generally State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 177 N.W. 937
(1920); People v. Jaques, 137 Cal. App. 2d 823, 291 P.2d 124 (1955). "The line is
drawn, however, where neither the element of a common enterprise nor the element of
reliance on the efforts of another is present." 1 Loss, SEcurumls REGULATIONS 491
(2d ed. 1961).
1968]
SAN DIEGO LAW1 REVIEW
mal decisional participation, would obviate the aegis of the Corpo-
rate Securities Law. But inasmuch as the theory, which underlies
nonparticipation as an element of a security, is that a person partici-
pating in the business has an opportunity to protect his own invest-
ment and does not need the protection of the act,8 it would seem that
only participation that actually allows the franchisee a real opportun-
ity for self-protection should take the agreement out of the auspices
of the security regulations. An agreement allowing a minimum of
decisional participation conceivably does not allow sufficient oppor-
tunity for the franchisee to protect himself, regardless of the degree
of physical or ministerial participation. Decision-making, rather than
personal service, is generally the significant factor in developing
profit and success.86
Another variation of this problem arises when the franchisee is
offered the choice of only nominally participating or of actively
participating in the franchised business. While the offer, as well as
the sale of unregistered securities, is contrary to the provisions of the
act,87 it does not necessarily follow that, if the investor has the choice
between the two alternatives, the form of the offer must control the
legal characterization of the sale. Both Joiner and Howey indicate
that the terms of the offer would control, whether in fact a security
is being offered. Joiner stated the test of a security to be the "char-
acter the instrument is given in commerce by the terms of the offer
... and the economic inducements held out to the prospect."88 In
that case, the sales literature did not mention the alternative of the
purchaser doing his own drilling for oil, but rather, stressed that the
Joiner Corporation would undertake this operation.
In Howey, the test was whether the investor "is led to expect
profits"8 9 from one other than the investor. The importance of the
form of the offer, as determinative of the characterization of the
85 See People v. Syde, 37 Cal. 2d 765, 235 P.2d 601 (1951). See also Coleman,
supra note 2.
86 The Syde case presents a different aspect of the problem. In that case the
participation by the child actors defeated the application of the Corporate Securities
Law even though their participation did not extend to any decision making activities.
In the Syde case, it is arguable that personal service, or the talent of the participants
was the significant profit producing activity. This situation is distinguishable from the
usual franchise situation where decision making is the more significant profit producing
activity. Note, however, that the courts have not yet attempted to delineate the exact
quality of participation necessary to preclude the control of the act.
87 See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25009 (West 1955).
88 320 U.S. at 352-53.
89 328 U.S. at 299.
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transaction, is emphasized in Howey by the facts of the case-only
85 percent of the purchasers of the citrus groves signed a service
contract with Howey-in-the-Hills Service Company, but even as to
the 15 percent who did not sign this service contract, a sale of a
security was present.
These factual illustrations indicate that there is a distinction be-
tween joiner and Howey and situations where the offer would pro-
vide, as an alternative, either active or nominal participation in the
operation of the franchised business.
To determine whether a security is being offered as well as being
sold, when the franchise offer provides alternatives, a reasonable test
should consider the underlying economic realities of the venture, in
addition to the economic inducements held out to the public 0 This
analysis does not solve the problem presented because a security is
still being offered in the form of the nonparticipating agreement
regardless of what is finally sold. The form of the Corporate
Securities Law prevents the resolution of this particular problem as
it requires filing for a permit for the offer as well as the sale of a
franchise providing such alternatives. This requirement serves as
an unnecessary interference with and an unjustifiable expense to
business.
The second situation posed by the Attorney General-where the
franchisee is to participate actively in the franchised business and the
franchisor is to supply him with goods and services-presents no
substantial problem. The rule in situations of this type was succinctly
stated in People v. Syde: -[T]he Corporate Securities Law was not
intended to afford supervision and regulation of instruments which
constitute agreements with persons who expect to reap a profit from
their own services or other active participation in a business ven-
ture."91
B. Risk Capital Concept Applied
to Franchises
The third hypothetical posed by the Attorney General is that in
which the franchisee participates actively, yet the franchisor is to
provide goods and services and intends to secure a substantial por-
tion of the initial capital needed to provide these services, from the
franchisee.
90 See Coleman, supra note 2, at 507-08.
91 37 Cal. 2d at 768, 235 P.2d at 603.
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This situation is exactly the same as the second, with the added
factor that some of the franchisee's money is to be used by the
franchisor as initial capital, thereby enabling him to provide goods
and services to the franchisee. The second situation is clearly not a
security because of the franchisee's active' participation; but the
third situation does represent a security in the opinion of the Attorney
General, even though it is clear that the franchisee does intend to
participate actively. In defense of his conclusion, the Attorney Gen-
eral's opinion adds that the "risk capital" test should be applied
to augment the participation test.
This opinion is apparently the first to recognize and use the "risk
capital" test in discussing franchise agreements. 2 Without first
offering a definition of risk capital, the Attorney General uses the
term as follows: "If a franchisor solicits fees from his franchisees in
order to raise a substantial portion of his initial capitalization (i.e.,
'risk capital'), the analogy to the Silver Hills fact situation is com-
plete."' 3 From this interchangeable use of the expressions "risk
capital" and "initial capital," the conclusion could be drawn that, in
the opinion of the Attorney General, their meaning is identical. He
cites that portion of the Silver Hills case where the court recognized
that the transaction was not an "ordinary sale of a right to use
existing facilities."' 4 However, observe that the Attorney General
stated, "a substantial portion of the initial capital (i.e., 'risk cap-
ital') ." Thus it is unclear whether risk capital means merely initial
capital or rather a substantial portion of the initial capital. The latter
construction is supported by the passage: "Finally, it is not clear
what degree of undercapitalization by the franchisor will cause the
fees paid by the franchisee to be characterized as 'risk capital' . . .. ,
This indicates that if the investor's money were only a minimal
portion of the initial capital (as opposed to a "substantial portion")
then it would not be characterized as risk capital, since there would
be no undercapitalization by the franchisor in relation to the minimal
investment of the franchisee. So interpreted, "risk capital," that is,
a substantial portion of initial capital, is more restrictive than initial
capital. This limited definition would encompass only situations of
excessive undercapitalization.
In terms of the three possible definitions discussed above, the
02 49 OPS. CAL. ATfy GEN. 124 (1967).
93 Id. at 128.
91 Id. See 55 Cal. 2d at 815, 361 P.2d at 908, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
95 49 Ops. CAL. ATT'Y GEN. at 129.
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Attorney General is persuaded that the Silver Hills court used "risk
capital" to mean "risky, initial capital."9 6 Accordingly, in the opinion
of the Attorney General, in no case will money which is not initial
capital be characterized as risk capital, regardless of what other
circumstances exist.
This definition of "risk capital" seems entirely consistent with the
Silver Hills case, but the important question is whether it will be
useful in its application to other fact situations. A situation where
money is invested in an unproven venture, which is set up such that
the investor stands less than a fair chance of success and is unable to
protect himself, would indeed, seem to come within the regulatory
purpose of the Corporate Securities Law. The Attorney General is
convinced that this situation exists where the franchisor agrees to
supply goods and services to the franchisee, intending to use the
franchisee's money to accomplish this goal. He contends that provid-
ing risk capital is
a separate business risk apart from the success or failure of the
franchisee's conduct of the franchised business, and should be treated
as such for purposes of the Corporate Securities Law. Moreover,
... this accords with the intent of the parties; the incentive for
franchise arrangements is to give the franchisee the status of an
independent businessman apart from the franchisor.97
The Attorney General reasons that the franchisee is investing in two
separate business ventures. One is the operation of the franchised
business. In this aspect the franchisee does not need the protection
of the act, since he is to control the profitability of the enterprise
through his own efforts. The other business venture involves invest-
ment into the operation which is to be conducted by the franchisor to
provide goods and services to the franchisee. In the latter venture,
the franchisee takes a passive position with no control and, therefore,
needs the protection of the act. This "double-investment" analysis
is subject to serious doubt. Why should the franchisee be concerned
with what the franchisor intends to do with the money received from
the sale of the franchise? Naturally, the franchisee would be in-
terested in the ability of the franchisor to continue to provide the
necessary goods and services, but this is one of the normal risks of
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It is axiomatic that if money is paid to a-franchisor with the ex-
pectation that goods and services will be forthcoming, and the
success or failure of the business turns on the continued supply of
such goods and services, the money is being ventured on the fran-
chisor's future performance. Is it not as valid to say that where, for
example, the franchisee invests considerable sums erecting a building,
buying equipment, and otherwise making expendituresVSkthe use-
fulness of which depend on the continued supply of the goods and
services-the money is being ventured on future performance by the
franchisor. Granted, the money paid is held, in one case by the
franchisor, and in the other by some third person, but such a differ-
ence would be of little significance in the mind of the franchisee.
Therefore, it is arguable that whenever, for the success of his venture,
the franchisee depends on the franchisor to provide goods and
services, all of the money is risked on further performance by the
franchisor, a division of the total amount of investment into two
separate investments would be logically unsupportable.
If the above objection to the double-investment analysis is re-
solved, a further hurdle must be overcome. The argument could be
made that even though the franchisee takes a passive role, he
expects no monetary return and, therefore, the agreement is not a
security. This argument, of course, would have had greater impact
prior to Silver Hills where the expectation of monetary profit as an
element of security was tempered. In the Attorney General's third
hypothetical, even though the franchisee expects a return of goods
and services, he will have to pay for such goods and services as they
are received, in addition to the franchise price. The relationship of
the parties to the agreement to provide goods and services seems to
be no more than that of two parties to a simple contract for goods
and services.
C. A Hypothetical Franchise
To bring the discussion from the abstract to the concrete, consider
this illustration: Hot-Dogs Inc. offers to franchise, for $20,000, one
hot dog stand with a complete "formula for successful operation."
The franchisor agrees to provide all of the physical facilities neces-
sary, along with detailed printed instructions telling the franchisee
exactly how to operate the stand. The agreement also provides that
the franchisee must purchase his entire supply of hot dogs from the
98 These are expenses that otherwise would have been incurred by the franchisor if
he distributed the product himself.
[Vol. 5
NOTES
franchisor. Hot-Dogs Inc. envisions this franchising program as a
method of establishing an extensive, reliable.market for the sale of
its hot dogs. While both parties recognize that this arrangement is
advantageous to the franchisor, the franchisee is convinced that the
other features justify the acceptance of the exclusive buying clause
as a part of the franchise agreement. The franchisor has already paid
for and obtained all of the physical facilities to be provided to the
franchisee, and the instruction manual is complete and available in
large quantities. Still, he does intend to use the money paid by the
franchisee in the operation of his hot dog plant.
To be compatible with the Attorney General's approach, this
agreement would be classified as a security. Arguably, the franchisee
is taking a risk that the business of the franchisor may not continue
to succeed, and he is investing money and taking a passive interest
in the hot dog supplying business of his franchisor. The theory is that
a portion of the $20,000 is for the "formula for success," and a por-
tion is allocated to secure the continued supply of hot dogs. However,
inasmuch as the franchisee will be paying for the hot dogs as they
are delivered, is it not just as logical to say that all of the money
paid was for purchase of the franchised business, and no money was
risked on the franchisor's ability to continue to supply the hot dogs?
Suppose the hot dogs supplied by the franchisor are of inferior
quality and are higher priced than others available on the market.
In this situation, the franchisee would be unconcerned over the
possibility that the franchisor will fail to meet his obligation, and
might even want to be free to seek his supply of hot dogs from
another source. Certainly the franchisee does not need the protection
of the Corporate Securities Law to insure a continued supply of
inferior, overpriced hot dogs. The fact that the franchisor happens
to be using the money, contributed by the franchisee to supply the hot
dogs, should not necessarily mean that the franchisee has invested in
the hot dog business. It seems entirely possible, if not probable, that
the elements which really interested the buyer, and those for which
he was willing to pay, did not include the agreement to purchase hot
dogs from the franchisor.
Consider an exaggerated situation where the right to use the name
"Hot-Dogs Inc." alone is considered to be worth $20,000, but a sale
is made of the whole package, described above, for $10,000. Would
the franchisee still be providing risk capital, and would a security
therefore exist, merely because the money is being used by the fran-
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chisor to provide the goods and services? It is submitted that the
possibility that the franchisee intends to invest into the franchisor's
business is dearly obviated by the hypothetical facts. Although the
franchisee receives more than full consideration with the granting of
the privilege to use the name, it is not necesary to invoke the protec-
tion of the Corporate Securities Law to secure any further benefits to
the franchisee. In this situation, the Attorney General's double-invest-
ment analysis is not consistent with reality and should not be
employed.
The Attorney General's opinion should be qualified, so that a
security would exist in circumstances such as the following. Assume
facts similar to those of the hypothetical posed above, except that the
hot dogs are made according to a secret formula held only by Hot-
Dogs Inc. The stands have no special appeal, other than the fact that
the public has shown a great appreciation for the unusual taste of the
hot dogs. The method of operation and the other ingredients provided
for the franchisee are considered of relatively little value; clearly,
the real value of the franchise is the license to buy hot dogs made
from the special formula. In addition, the franchisor is fully ex-
tended financially because the idea is relatively new and unproven.
Thus, the initial stages of the operation have been financed on a
shoestring, forcing the franchisor to use the money which he receives
from the sale of a franchise, in order to provide the goods and ser-
vices. This is the type of situation where the franchisee depends on
the services to be rendered, and has no way of protecting his invest-
ment because his participation is limited to his own stand and does
not extend to the hot dog factory.
The wisdom of limiting the application of the Blue Sky Law to
situations where initial capital is contributed is also dubious. If the
purpose of the Corporate Securities Law is to protect the investing
public against spurious schemes, why does the Attorney General not
define risk capital to include schemes to raise capital for an existing
but unproven business, as well as schemes to raise initial capital? This
criticism would apply with equal validity, even if initial capital in-
dudes the capitalization of new ventures within a going business,
such as a new franchising program organized by an existing business.
It is submitted that any attempt to raise money should fall within
the act, if the other components of a security are present. The limita-
tion to initial capital is unnecessarily restrictive.
In summary, the conclusion that a security is described by the third
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hypothetical posed by the Attorney General is susceptible to attack.
The problem is not analyzed thoroughly. In conjunction with the
elements of active participation, an agreement to provide goods and
services, and the existence of risk capital, it should also be necessary
to find that the success of the franchised business depends, at least
in part, on the goods and services to be provided, and that the
franchisee contemplates, or the facts show, that part of the money
paid must be allocated for the privilege of receiving the goods and
services. Where all of the elements mentioned are present, the situa-
tion falls within the regulatory purpose of the Corporate Securities
Law and a security is evinced.
D. The Division of Corporations Guidelines
In July of 1967, shortly after the opinion of the Attorney General
was written, the "risk capital" test was applied for the second time
to the subject of franchise agreements in a bulletin from the Division
of Corporations. 0
In this bulletin, the California Corporations Commissioner takes
special interest in the third situation posed by the Attorney General.'
The Commissioner, in paraphrasing the opinion of the Attorney
General, declares that "[p]ursuant to the opinion ... [a] franchise
constitutes a security ... where.., a substantial portion of the initial
risk capital of the franchisor is to be contributed by the franchisee."'
10
'
Note that the Commissioner uses the phrase "initial risk capital,"
while the Attorney General used either "initial" or "risk" capital.
However, the Commissioner purports to be merely paraphrasing the
Attorney General and, therefore, any change in the terms that might
appear could be the result of an inadvertant combination of words.
At any rate, the semantic discussion should be abandoned in discover-
ing which characteristics the Commissioner perceives as significant
to the resolution that a particular franchise agreement comprises a
security. According to the Commissioner, the implication will arise
that a security exists unless the franchisor can show: (1) adequate
capital to operate the franchising program for an indefinite length of
time, without the necessity of resorting to the funds to be contributed
by the franchisee; (2) successful business operation in the past; and
(3) adequate facilities to successfully administer the franchising
9 CAL. Div. OF CORP., Bull. No. 67-8 (July 14, 1967).
"0 49 Ops. CAL. ATr'y GEN. at 125.
101 CAL. Div. oF CoRP. Bull. No. 67-8 (July 14, 1967).
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program."" The Commissioner insists that ordinarily this implication
will arise unless all three enumerated conditions coexist.
Regardless of the meaning the Commissioner attaches to "initial
risk capital," it is obvious from the guidelines that the emphasis is
on general protection of the franchisee-investor. The franchisor has
to be financially sound; he must have proven his stability in the past;
and it must appear that he will be solid in the future. If the franchisor
was or is operating an unsound business, any investment which de-
pends on the continued operation of that business will be considered
a security. If the franchisor has demonstrated his stability, as required
by the three guidelines, then the operation is considered safe. The
investment would involve a low level of risk, and would not be a
security. No doubt, there is general consensus that where the circum-
stances surrounding a franchise agreement embody all of the de-
scribed conditions, the presence of a security is not indicated. The
question, however, is whether the absence of any or all of these
factors would necessarily indicate that a security existed. The Com-
missioner amplifies his statement by adding that if any one of the
factors is missing, the franchise may be a security, and that if para-
graph 1 is not present, then the franchise will ordinarily be a security.
Paragraph 1 restates, in essence, the composition of paragraph 3 of
the Attorney General's opinion: the franchisor intends to secure the
102 Id. The content of this bulletin is as follows:
Subject: Franchises
Pursuant to the opinion of the Attorney General dated June 2, 1967, No.
66/284, a franchise constitutes a security subject to the permit requirement of
the Corporate Securities Law where either the franchisee is to take a passive
role in the franchised business, or a substantial portion of the initial risk
capital of the franchisor is to be contributed by the franchisee. Accordingly,
in these circumstances the Commissioner of Corporations will entertain permit
applications for the sale of franchises.
In circumstances where the franchise constitutes a security, it may not be
offered or sold without first obtaining a permit.
Where the franchisee actively participates in the operation of the franchised
business, all circumstances must be considered in determining whether the
franchise constitutes a security. Ordinarily the existence of all of the following
factors will lead to the conclusion that a particular franchise is not a security:
1. The franchisor, without resort to funds to be contributed by the franchisee,
has sufficient capital to operate the franchising program, to provide the
facilities, paraphernalia, and services promised to the franchisees, and to
continue these activities for an indefinite period of time.
2. The franchisor's business has a history of successful operation for a sufficient
length of time to adequately demonstrate the public demand for the fran-
chised product or service.
3. The franchisor has adequate organization, facilities, management, and other
experienced personnel available or on call, justifying the conclusion that
he will be able to successfully administer the franchising program and to
confer upon the franchisee the benefits offered by the program.
If any one of the foregoing factors is lacking, the franchise may be a
security. If the factor mentioned in paragraph 1 is lacking, the franchise
ordinarily will be deemed a security.
necessary risk capital from his franchisee so as to supply goods and
services. Difficulties inherent in that situation are discussed above
in relation to the Attorney General's opinion, and the same criticism
applies here.
The Commissioner is understandably concerned with the possibil-
ity that the franchisor may be undercapitalized, thereby forcing the
franchisee to accept risks in addition to those included in the opera-
tion of the franchised business. This type of concern is warranted
under the Corporate Securities Law, but it appears that the Com-
missioner, in his zeal to prevent the franchisee-investor from suffering
the burdens of undercapitalization, is forcing the franchisor to suffer
the burdens of overcapitalization. Empirically, it would seem very
unusual to find a business that was running without resort to all
available funds from any source. It would be considered poor business
management to leave large sums of capital idle. Businessmen strive to
maintain all available funds active in the business to produce further
profit.
To conceptualize the problem, imagine a case where a corporation
is running a successful hotel. A decision is made to franchise an
identical hotel in another city. The agreement provides that the
franchisor is to supply everything needed to operate the new hotel,
the franchisee need only walk in, hire his staff and begin business.
The original hotel has been run successfully for years under the
direction of a man considered to be outstanding in hotel management.
In the opinion of "Wall Street experts," the franchisee will un-
doubtedly succeed under the guidance of the franchisor. Providing the
hotel itself and the "paraphernalia" necessary to operate the fran-
chising program is naturally very expensive; therefore, the agreed
price for the franchise is, for example, five million dollars. Does the
Commissioner imagine that the franchisor will be able to put the five
million dollars in the bank and, "without [resorting] ... to funds to
be contributed by the franchisee, [have] ... sufficient capital to
operate the franchising program ... and to continue these activities
for an indefinite period of time?"1°3 It would be a very strange busi-
ness practice to run such an operation. What the Commissioner is
suggesting is tantamount to the conclusion that every sale of a fran-
chise, where the franchisor is to provide goods and services, is the
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In his second paragraph, the Commissioner indicates that he will
be looking for indication from the past that the franchisee will get
what the sale was purported to include. He suggests, "a history of
successful operation for a sufficient length of time to adequately
demonstrate the public demand for the franchised product or ser-
vice,"' 0 4 but he adds that the absence of this factor may, but does
not necessarily, indicate a security. Presumably if the historical indica-
tion is absent, as where a new enterprise is involved, the Commissioner
would be willing to substitute some other indication that success is
imminent.
In the third paragraph the Commissioner emphasizes the ability
of the franchisor's organization to provide the promised benefits of
the franchising program.
Despite the fact that the Attorney General suggested that, "[n] o
definite guidelines can be drawn,"'105 and that each method of
financing a franchising program should be "examined on its mer-
its,"'1 6 the Commissioner chose to reduce consideration to three main
factors. How precisely he intended the guidelines to be followed is
not indicated.
It is submitted that the concern of the Commissioner would be more
realistic if, instead of the guidelines stated, the test were as follows:
If the franchisor is adequately financed and organized, such that,
from past operation or from reasonable economic indications, it
appears that the franchisee stands at least a fair chance of realizing
the benefits that he bargained for and purchased, then the agreement
is not a security. In other cases, it is, if the other elements of a security
are present. This type of a test would be consistent with the Silver
Hills interpretation of the regulatory purpose of the Corporate
Securities Law.
VI. CONCLUSION
There are several express categories in which securities are classi-
fied; however, if franchise agreements are securities, the great major-
ity come within the category of investment contracts.
Prior to the decision in Howey, the components of an investment
contract had been variously interpreted by the courts. With the Howey
decision, however, the elements of an investment contract were
104 Id.




clearly defined as a common venture, and the expectation of profits
to-be derived solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party.
Courts subsequently began applying the second element as two com-
plementary factors. First, they required the expectation of monetary
profits. Second, the Howey test was broadened by deleting the word
"solely" and requiring only profits derived from the efforts of others.
This second factor is controlled by the "participation element,"
termed the chief criterion of an investment contract. Necessarily,
when the investor participates, his profits are not derived from the
efforts of others. These factors were varied slightly in later decisions
as demanded by the particular facts of each case, but generally the
rules remained intact.
Fifteen years after Howey, the California Supreme Court decided
Silver Hills in an opinion which stated unequivocally that the expec-
tation of monetary profit was not a requisite element of a security.
This represented a significant modification of the Howey test. Al-
though Silver Hills was not concerned with investment contracts, it
is possible to extract the decision's principles and apply them to in-
vestment contracts, thereby deriving an alternative to the Howey test.
A combination of the Howey test and the alternative derived from
Silver Hills as applied to franchise agreements would require the
following before a security is said to be present:
1. A common enterprise,
2. expectation of monetary profit or some other benefit and,
3. either
a. nonparticipation or,
b. a double-investment situation where there is a contribution
of risk capital, as well as nonparticipation in the franchior's
separate business.
In addition, it must appear that the situation falls within the regula-
tory purpose of the Corporate Securities Law.
Defining the test is difficult, but the real problem is presented in
its application. The most troublesome problems concerning franchise
agreements are: first, delimiting participation and nonparticipation;
second, determining when the double-investment analysis should be
applied; and third, discovering when risk capital is present.
In the normal franchise situation, in order to be participating, the
buyer should have some discretionary, as opposed to ministerial con-
trol.
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The determination that the double-investment analysis is appropri-
ate and applicable requires that three conditions coexist: (1) the
franchise contract must contemplate that the franchisor is to supply
goods and services to the franchisee; (2) it must be found that the
buyer intended, or the facts show, that a portion of the money paid
to the franchisor be allocated to secure a continued supply of goods
and services-that is, the franchisee is investing in the franchisor's
business; (3) the franchisee's business must depend on the product
or service to be supplied.
Even if it is found that the double-investment analysis is applicable,
this fact will not be operative unless in addition it is ascertained that
the money invested is risk capital. Such a finding necessitates a
definitional interpretation of the phrase. Although the meaning is
not delineated in Silver Hills, a clear construction is required to
facilitate the application of the concept to franchise agreements.
Analysis suggests that risk capital should be accepted as denoting
money invested with less than a fair chance of success. Evaluation of
the chances of success should be made with reference to circum-
stances such as the financial structure of the franchisor's business,
the ratio of money to be invested by the franchisor as compared to
that invested by the franchisee, the history of the franchisor's opera-
tion, the general economic conditions of the industry, and any other
pertinent indications that may predict either imminent success or
failure.
Where determinations are made such that all of the tests are
satisfied, an investment contract exists, and additionally, should the
situation fall within the regulatory purpose of the act, a security
exists. This purpose is fulfilled if there is an offer to the public at
large, with the investor taking a passive position in the franchisor's
business, and the offeror intending to conduct the enterprise with
the franchisee's money. Where the suggested test is satisfied, these
features will ordinarily be present.
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